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Abstract
In this paper we address the problem of measuring the degree of con-
sensus/dissensus in a context where experts or agents express their opinions
on alternatives or issues by means of cardinal evaluations. To this end we
propose a new class of distance-based consensus model, the family of the
Mahalanobis dissensus measures for profiles of cardinal values. We set forth
some meaningful properties of the Mahalanobis dissensus measures. Finally,
an application over a real empirical example is presented and discussed.
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1. Introduction
In Decision Making Theory and its applications, consensus measurement
and its reaching in a society (i.e., a group of agents or experts) are relevant
research issues. Many studies investigating the aforementioned subjects have
been carried out under several frameworks (see Herrera-Viedma et al. (2002),
Fedrizzi et al. (2007), Dong et al. (2008), Cabrerizo et al. (2010), Dong et al.
(2010), Fu and Yang (2012), Dong and Zhang (2014), Palomares et al. (2014),
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Wu and Chiclana (2014b,a), Liu et al. (2015) and Wu et al. (2015) among
others) and based on different methodologies (Gonza´lez-Pacho´n and Romero
(1999), Cook (2006), Eklund et al. (2007), Fedrizzi et al. (2007), Eklund
et al. (2008), Chiclana et al. (2013), Fu and Yang (2010, 2011), Palomares
and Mart´ınez (2014), Gong et al. (2015) and Liu et al. (2015) among others).
Since the seminal contribution by Bosch (2005) several authors have ad-
dressed the consensus measurement topic from an axiomatic perspective.
Earlier analyses can be mentioned, e.g., Hays (1960) or Day and McMorris
(1985). This issue is also seen as the problem of combining a set of ordinal
rankings to obtain an indicator of their ‘consensus’, a term with multiple
possible meanings (Mart´ınez-Panero (2011)).
Generally speaking, the usual axiomatic approaches assume that each
individual expresses his or her opinions through ordinal preferences over the
alternatives. A group of agents is characterized by the set of their preferences
–their preference profile. Then a consensus measure is a mapping which
assigns to each preference profile a number between 0 and 1. The assumption
is made that the higher the values, the more consensus in the profile.
Technical restrictions on the preferences provide various approaches in
the literature. In most cases the agents are presumed to linearly order the
alternatives (see Bosch (2005) or Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2013)). Since
this assumption seems rather demanding (especially as the number of alter-
natives grows), an obvious extension is to allow for ties. This is the case
where the agents have complete preorders on the alternatives (e.g., Garc´ıa-
Lapresta and Pe´rez-Roma´n (2011)). Alcantud et al. (2013a, 2015) take a
different position. They study the case where agents have dichotomous opin-
ions on the alternatives, a model that does not necessarily require pairwise
comparisons.
Notwithstanding the use of different ordinal preference frameworks, the
problem of how to measure consensus is an open-ended question in several
research areas. This fact is due to that methodology used in each case is a rel-
evant element in the problem addressed. To date various methods have been
developed to measure consensus under ordinal preference structures based
on distances and association measures like Kemeny’s distance, Kendall’s co-
efficient, Goodman-Kruskal’s index and Spearman’s coefficient among others
(see e.g., Spearman (1904), Kemeny (1959), Goodman and Kruskal (1979),
Cook and Seiford (1982) and Kendall and Gibbons (1990)).
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In this paper we first tackle the analysis of coherence that derives from
profiles of cardinal rather than ordinal evaluations. Modern convention
applies the term cardinal to measurements that assign significance to diffe-
rences (cf., Basu (1982), High and Bloch (1989), Chiclana et al. (2009)). By
contrast ordinal preferences only permit to order the alternatives from best
to worst without any additional information. To see how this affects the
analysis of our problem, let us consider a naive example of a society with two
agents. They evaluate two public goods with monetary amounts. One agent
gives a value of 1e for the first good and 2e for the second good. The other
agent values these goods at 10e and 90e respectively. If we only use the
ordinal information in this case, we should conclude that there is unanimity
in the society: all members agree that ‘good 2 is more valuable than good
1’. However the agents disagree largely. Therefore, the subtleties of cardi-
nality clearly have an impact when we aim at measuring the cohesiveness of
cardinal evaluations.
Unlike previous references, we adopt the notion of dissensus measure as
the fundamental concept. This seems only natural because it resembles more
the notion of a “measure of statistical dispersion”, in the sense that 0 captures
the natural notion of unanimity as total lack of variability among agents, and
then increasingly higher numbers mean more disparity among evaluations in
the profile.1
In order to build a particular dissensus measure we adopt a distance-based
approach. Firstly, one computes the distances between each pair of indivi-
duals. Then all these distances are aggregated. In our present proposal the
distances (or similarities) are computed through the Mahalanobis distance
(Mahalanobis (1936)). We thus define the class of Mahalanobis dissensus
measures.
The Mahalanobis distance plays an important role in Statistics and Data
Analysis. It arises as a natural generalization of the Euclidean distance.
A Mahalanobis distance accounts for the effects of differences in scales and
associations among magnitudes. Consequently, building on the well-known
performance of the Mahalanobis distance, our novel proposal seems especially
fit for the cases when the measurement units of the issues are different, e.g.,
1As a remote antecedent of this position, we note that statistically variance-based
methods are commonly employed to measure consensus of verbal opinions (cf., Hoffman
(1994) and Mejias et al. (1996).
3
performance appraisal processes when employees are evaluated attending to
their productivity and their leadership capacity; or where the issues are cor-
related. For example, evaluation of related public projects. An antecedent
for the weaker case of profiles of preferences has been provided elsewhere, cf.
Alcantud et al. (2013b), and an application to comparisons of real rankings
on universities worldwide is developed. Here we apply our new indicator to
a real situation, namely, economic forecasts made by several agencies. Since
the forecasts concern economic quantities, they have an intrinsic value which
is naturally cardinal and also there are relations among them.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce basic nota-
tion and definitions. In Section 3, we set forth the class of the Mahalanobis
dissensus measures and their main properties. Section 4 provides a compari-
son of several Mahalanobis dissensus measures. Next, a practical application
with discussion is given in Section 5. Finally, we present some concluding
remarks. Appendices contain proofs of some properties and a short review
in matrix algebra.
2. Notation and definitions
This section is devoted to introduce some notation and a new concept in
order to compare group cohesiveness: namely, dissensus measures. Then, a
comparison with the standard approach is made. We partially borrow nota-
tion and definitions from Alcantud et al. (2013b). In addition, we use some
elements of matrix analysis that we recall in the AppendixB to make the
paper self-contained.
Let X = {x1, ..., xk} be the finite set of k issues, options, alternatives,
or candidates. It is assumed that X contains al least two options, i.e., the
cardinality of X is at least 2. Abusing notation, on occasions we refer to
issue xs as issue s for convenience. A population of agents or experts is a
finite subset N = {1, 2, ..., N} of natural numbers. To avoid trivialities we
assume N > 1.
We consider that each expert evaluates each alternative by means of a
quantitative value. The quantitative information gathered from the set of N
experts on the set of k alternatives is summarized by an N × k numerical
matrix M :
M =
(
Mij
)
N×k
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We write Mi to denote the evaluation vector of agent i over the issues (i.e.,
row i of M) and M j to denote the vector with all the evaluations for issue
j (i.e., column j of M). For convenience, (1)N×k denotes the N × k matrix
whose cells are all equal to 1 and 1N denotes the column vector whose N
elements are equal to 1. We write MN×k for the set of all N × k real-valued
matrices. Any M ∈MN×k is called a profile.
Any permutation σ of the experts {1, 2, ..., N} determines a profile Mσ
by permutation of the rows of M : row i of the profile Mσ is row σ(i) of
the profile M . Similarly, any permutation pi of the alternatives {1, 2, ..., k}
determines a profile piM by permutation of the columns of M : column i of
the profile piM is column pi(i) of the profile M .
For each profile M ∈ MN×k, its restriction to subprofile on the issues in
I ⊆ X, denoted M I, arises from exactly selecting the columns of M that
are associated with the respective issues in I (in the same order). And for
simplicity, if I = {j} then M I = M{j} = M j is column j of M . Any partition
{I1, . . . , Is} of {1, 2, . . . , k}, that we identify with a partition of X, generates
a decomposition of M into subprofiles M I1 , . . . ,M Is . 2
A profile M ∈ MN×k is unanimous if the evaluations for all the alterna-
tives are the same across experts. In matrix terms, the columns ofM ∈MN×k
are constant, or equivalently, all rows of the profile are coincident.
An expansion of a profile M ∈MN×k of N on X = {x1, ..., xk} is a profile
M¯ ∈ MN¯×k of N¯ = {1, ..., N,N + 1, . . . , N¯} on X = {x1, ..., xk}, such that
the restriction of M¯ to the first N experts of N coincides with M .
Finally, a replication of a profile M ∈ MN×k of the society N on
X = {x1, ..., xk} is the profile M unionmulti M ∈ M2N×k obtained by duplicating
each row of M , in the sense that rows t and N + t of M unionmultiM are coincident
and equal to row t of M , for each t = 1, . . . , N .
We now define a dissensus measure as follows:
Definition 1. A dissensus measure on MN×k is a mapping defined by
δ : MN×k → [0,∞) with the property:
i) Unanimity : for each M ∈ MN×k, δ(M) = 0 if and only if the profile
M ∈MN×k is unanimous.
2A partition of a set S is a collection of pairwise disjoints non-empty subsets of S whose
union is S.
5
We also define a normal dissensus measure as a dissensus measure that
additionally verifies:
ii) Anonymity : δ(Mσ) = δ(M) for each permutation σ of the agents and
M ∈MN×k.
iii) Neutrality : δ(piM) = δ(M) for each permutation pi of the alternatives
and M ∈MN×k.
This definition does not attempt to state dissensus by opposition to con-
sensus. The literature usually deals with a formulation of consensus where
the higher the index, the more coherence in the society’s opinions. The terms
consensus and dissensus should not be taken as formal antonyms, especially
because a universally accepted definition of consensus is not available and
we do not intend to give an absolute concept of dissensus. However, consen-
sus measures in the sense of Bosch (see Bosch (2005), Definition 3.1) verify
anonymity and neutrality (see also Alcantud et al. (2013b), Definition 1),
and from a purely technical viewpoint, they relate to dissensus measures as
follows.
Lemma 1. If µ is a consensus measure then 1 − µ is a normal dissensus
measure. Conversely, if δ is a normal dissensus measure then 1
δ+1
is a con-
sensus measure.
Proof 1. We just need to recall that the mapping i : [0,∞) −→ (0, 1] given
by i(x) = 1
x+1
is strictly decreasing. 
3. The class of Mahalanobis dissensus measures and its properties
In this section we introduce a broad class of dissensus measures that
depends on a reference matrix, namely the Mahalanobis dissensus measures.
We also give its more prominent properties.
Our interest is to cover the specific characteristics in cardinal profiles,
like possible differences in scales, and correlations among the issues. Before
providing our main definition, we recover the definition of the Mahalanobis
distance on which our measure is based.
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Definition 2. Let Σ ∈Mk×k be a positive definite matrix and let us assume
that x and y vectors from Rk are row vectors. The Mahalanobis (squared)
distance on Rk associated with Σ is defined by 3
dΣ(x, y) = (x− y)Σ−1(x− y)t
The off-diagonal elements of Σ permit to account for cross relations among
the issues or alternatives. Through the diagonal elements different measure-
ment scales can be incorporated. The Σ matrix contains variances and co-
variances among random variables when the Mahalanobis distance is used in
Statistical Data Analysis.
Definition 3. Let Σ ∈Mk×k be a positive definite matrix. The Mahalanobis
dissensus measure on MN×k associated with Σ is the mapping
δΣ : MN×k → R given by
δΣ(M) =
1
C2N
·
∑
i<j
dΣ(Mi,Mj) =
1
C2N
·
∑
i<j
(Mi −Mj)Σ−1(Mi −Mj)t (1)
for each profile M ∈ MN×k on k alternatives, where C2N = N(N−1)2 is the
number of non ordered pairs of the N agents.
Note that the above expression is the average of all distances between
the evaluation vectors provided by all pairs of agents according to the Ma-
halanobis distance associated with Σ (Definition 2).
It is immediate to check that δΣ verifies conditions i) and ii) for each
positive definite Σ matrix. But δΣ fails to satisfy neutrality like the following
example proves.
Example 1. Let Σ =
(
1 0
0 2
)
, k = 2 and N = 2. Then Σ−1 =
(
1 0
0 1
2
)
.
For M =
(
1 −1
3 0
)
one has M1 = (1,−1) and M2 = (3, 0). Then
3Our choice of dΣ(x, y) coincides with the original Mahalanobis’ definition (see Maha-
lanobis (1936)). In order to exploit the inclusion of the Euclidean distance, some authors
work with
√
dΣ(x, y) instead. In both cases we have distances on Rk.
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δΣ(M) =
1
C22
· ((1− 3, −1− 0) Σ−1 (1− 3, −1− 0)t) = 9
2
.
If the columns of M are permuted in order to obtain piM =
( −1 1
0 3
)
,
then
δΣ(
piM) =
1
C22
· ((−1− 0, 1− 3) Σ−1 (−1− 0, 1− 3)t) = 3.
Therefore
δΣ(
piM) = 3 6= 9
2
= δΣ(M),
which proves that δΣ does not verify neutrality.
Nevertheless, if the Σ matrix is adapted according to a specific permu-
tation of the alternatives then the Mahalanobis disensus measure verifies a
kind of “soft” neutrality like the following result proves.
Proposition 1. Let Σ ∈Mk×k be a positive definite matrix. For each profile
M ∈ MN×k and each permutation pi of the alternatives, i.e., a permutation
of {1, . . . , k},
δΣ(M) = δΣpi(
piM)
where Σpi = P tpi ΣPpi and Ppi is the permutation matrix corresponding to pi.
Proof 2. Using the definition of Mahalanobis dissensus measure (Definition
3), it is sufficient to prove that dΣpi(
piMi,
piMj) = dΣ(Mi,Mj)
dΣpi(
piMi,
piMj) = (
piMi −pi Mj) (Σpi)−1 (piMi −pi Mj)t =
= (MiPpi −MjPpi) (P tpiΣPpi)−1 (MiPpi −MjPpi)t =
= (Mi −Mj) Ppi P tpiΣ−1Ppi P tpi (Mi −Mj)t =
= (Mi −Mj)Σ−1(Mi −Mj)t =
= dΣ(Mi,Mj).
We have only used the fact that the permutation matrix Ppi is orthogonal. 
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3.1. Some particular specifications
Some special instances of Mahalanobis dissensus measures have specific
interpretations.
• If we have a single issue or alternative, then M ∈MN×1 is a vector and
Σ can be identified as a number c > 0. Then
δc(M) =
1
C2N
·
∑
i<j
1
c
(Mi −Mj)2 = 1
c
· 2N
N − 1 · S
2
M
where S2M is the sample variance of M .
4 Therefore the dissensus for
a single issue is the result of correcting its sample variance by a factor
of 1
c
· 2N
N−1 .
• If Σ is the identity, then δI(M) = 1
C2N
·
∑
i<j
k∑
r=1
(Mir −Mjr)2. This ex-
pression uses the square of the Euclidean distance between real-valued
vectors, thus it recovers a version of the consensus measure for ordinal
preferences based on this distance (Cook and Seiford (1982)). Hence-
forth δI is called the Euclidean dissensus measure.
• If Σ = diag(c11, . . . , ckk) is a diagonal matrix then dΣ(Mi,Mj) gives
the weighted average of the square of the differences in assessments for
each alternative between agents i and j, where the weight attached to
alternative r is 1
crr
:
δΣ(M) =
1
C2N
·∑i<j dΣ(Mi,Mj) =
=
1
C2N
·
∑
i<j
(
k∑
r=1
1
crr
· (Mir −Mjr)2
)
=
=
k∑
r=1
1
crr
· δI(M r).
4In order to check this, we use a well-known property of the variance: given a vector
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), whose mean is x, S
2
x =
1
n
∑n
i=1(xi−x)2 = 12n2
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1(xi−xj)2.
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This particular specification of the dissensus measure allows to incorpo-
rate different weights to the alternatives. This fact increases the rich-
ness of the analysis in comparison with the (square of the) Euclidean
distance. Furthermore, if Σ = λI for some λ > 0, then Proposition 2
below gives additional relationships.
The Proposition 2 gives the relation between the Euclidean dissensus
measure and the Mahalanobis dissensus measure associated to a matrix which
is a multiple of the identity matrix, Σ = λI.
Proposition 2. For each profile M ∈MN×k and λ > 0,
δλI(M) = δI(
1√
λ
·M) = 1
λ
· δI(M).
Proof 3. Using Definition 3, the assertion is direct if we check
dλI(Mi,Mj) = dI(
1√
λ
·Mi, 1√λ ·Mj) and dλI(Mi,Mj) = 1λ · dI(Mi,Mj).
dλI(Mi,Mj) = (Mi −Mj)(λI)−1(Mi −Mj)t =
= (Mi −Mj)

1
λ
· · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 1
λ
 (Mi −Mj)t =
=
k∑
r=1
1
λ
· (Mir −Mjr)2 =
k∑
r=1
(
1√
λ
·Mir − 1√
λ
·Mjr
)2
=
=
(
1√
λ
·Mi − 1√λ ·Mj
) 1 · · · 0... . . . ...
0 · · · 1
( 1√
λ
·Mi − 1√λ ·Mj
)t
=
= dI(
1√
λ
·Mi , 1√λ ·Mj).
dλI(Mi,Mj) =
1
λ
·
k∑
r=1
(Mir −Mjr)2 =
= 1
λ
· (Mi −Mj)
 1 · · · 0... . . . ...
0 · · · 1
 (Mi −Mj)t = 1λ · dI(Mi, Mj).

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3.2. Some properties of the class of Mahalanobis dissensus measures
Measuring cohesiveness by means of the Mahalanobis dissensus measure
ensures some interesting operational features. We proceed to examine them.
The proofs of these properties are given in AppendixA.
Let M ∈ MN×k denote a profile and let Σ, Σ1,Σ2 ∈ Mk×k be positive
definite matrices. The following properties hold true:
1. Neutrality . A dissensus measure δΣ verifies neutrality if and only if the
associated Σ matrix is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are
the same. Formally:
δΣ(M) = δΣ(
piM) any profile M ∈ MN×k and any permutation pi of
{1, . . . , k}, if and only if Σ = diag{λ, . . . , λ} for some λ > 0.
2. Oneness. If for a particular size N of a society the Mahalanobis dis-
sensus measures associated with two matrices coincide for all pos-
sible profiles, then the corresponding dissensus measures are equal.
Formally:
If for a fixed N it is the case that δΣ1(M) = δΣ2(M) for each profile
M ∈MN×k, then Σ1 = Σ2 , i.e., for each N ′ and M ′ ∈MN ′×k, it is also
the case that
δΣ1(M
′) = δΣ2(M
′).
3. Cardinal transformations. In contrast to ordinal assessments, cardi-
nal evaluations are dependent on scales. So an important question
arises about if the scale choice disturbs the cohesiveness measures. In
this regard, once we update the reference matrix accordingly, the Ma-
halanobis dissensus measures associated to Σ do not vary. This fact
happens even if we modify the scales of all issues in different way. In
addition, a simple translation of each issue by adding a number does
not change the cohesiveness measure. Formally:
Let a = (a1, . . . , ak)
t be a column vector and B = diag(b1, . . . , bk) be
a diagonal matrix. The affine transformation of the profile M ∈MN×k
is M∗ = 1N at + M B, M∗ ∈ MN×k. Its columns are defined by
M∗ j = aj · 1N + bj · M j and its rows are defined by
M∗i = (a1 + b1Mi1, . . . , ak + bkMik) = a+MiB .
11
If M∗ = 1N at + M B is a positive affine transformation of the profile
M ∈MN×k and Σ∗ = BΣBt is the corresponding adjusted Σ, then
δΣ∗(M
∗) = δΣ(M).
4. Replication monotonicity. When a non-unanimous society is repli-
cated, its dissensus measure increases. That is, if M ∈ MN×k is a
non-unanimous profile then
δΣ(M unionmultiM) =
(
2N − 2
2N − 1
)
· δΣ(M)
therefore
δΣ(M unionmultiM ) > δΣ(M).
We can note that the difference between such measures is negligible for
large societies. In addition, if we have an unanimous profile M ∈MN×k
then by Definition 1 i), δΣ verifies
δΣ(M unionmultiM) = δΣ(M) = 0.
5. Splitting the set of alternatives. Suppose that the set of alternatives is
divided in two (or more) subgroups, in such way that we do not con-
sider any possible cross-effect among subgroups (perhaps because we
know that there is not interdependence). Then the computation can
be simplified by referring to measures of the dissensus in sub-profiles
as follows.
Given Σ =
(
Σ11 0
0 Σ22
)
, where Σ11 ∈ Mr×r , Σ22 ∈ M(k−r)×(k−r) , for
each profile M = (M I1 ,M I2) where M I1 ∈MN×r , M I2 ∈MN×(k−r)
δΣ(M) = δΣ11(M
I1) + δΣ22(M
I2).
Remark 1. Note that if the Σ matrix was originally a block diagonal
matrix in the form Σ = diag(Σ11, . . . ,Σss), then it is possible to take the
corresponding partition of the set of alternatives, X = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ . . .∪ Is.
Consequently, the original profile M ∈ MN×K can be rewritten like
M = (M I1 ,M I2 , . . . ,M Is). Then
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δΣ(M) =
s∑
i=1
δΣii(M
Ii).
6. Adding alternatives. An extension of a profile M ∈ MN×k is a new
profile, M∗ ∈ MN×(k+r), such that M∗ includes r new alternatives.
Under this assumption, M∗ can be seen as a profile with two subgroups,
the initial and the new alternatives, M∗ = (M, Mnew) ∈ MN×(k+r) .
If the aforementioned subgroups of alternatives are not related then
Property 5 applies. Consequently,
δΣ∗(M
∗) = δΣ(M) + δΣnew(Mnew)
where Σ∗ =
(
Σ 0
0 Σnew
)
and Σnew ∈ Mr×r is the associated matrix
to the dissensus measure for the r new alternatives.
In the particular case where all the new alternatives added to the profile
M are evaluated equally by all agents,
δΣ∗(M
∗) = δΣ(M),
irrespective of Σnew because unanimous profiles produce dissensus mea-
sures equal to zero. This particular case is defined like a property called
“independence of irrelevant alternatives” in Alcantud et al. (2013a).
7. Adding agents to the society. Suppose that a new agent is added to
the society, then the Mahalonabis dissensus measure of the enlarged
society does not decrease. In addition, the increment is minimal when
the“average agent” is added up. Formally:
Let M ∈ MN×k be a profile and M¯ ∈ M(N+1)×k be its expansion
after incorporating the evaluations of a new agent. The Mahalanobis
dissensus measure for M¯ is
δΣ(M¯) =
N − 1
N + 1
· δΣ(M) + 1
C2N+1
·
N∑
i=1
dΣ(Mi, M¯N+1)
where M¯N+1 is the row of M¯ which incorporates the new agent’s as-
sessments for the alternatives.
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If the assessments of the new agent coincide with the average of the
original agents’ evaluations for each alternative, then the minimal in-
crement of the dissensus measure is obtained.
Remark 2. A particular case is when the Mahalanobis dissensus mea-
sure is zero, or equivalently, there exits unanimity. If we include a new
agent whose evaluations coincide with the assessments of the original
agents, the Mahalanobis dissensus measure continues being zero.
4. Comparison of Mahalanobis dissensus measures
In practical situations we could potentially use various Mahalanobis dis-
sensus measures for profiles of cardinal information.5 Hence it is worth study-
ing the relations among evaluations achieved when we vary the reference
matrices. This section addresses this point.
Theorems 1 and 2 below identify conditions on matrices that ensure con-
sistent comparisons between Mahalanobis dissensus measures, whatever the
number of agents. Based on these theorems, a final result gives bounds for
the Mahalanobis dissensus measure.
Along this section Σ1, Σ2 ∈ Mk×k denote two positive definite matrices
and dΣ1 , dΣ2 denote the corresponding Mahalanobis (squared) distances on
Rk associated to Σ1 and Σ2. Let λ(i)1 ≥ λ(i)2 ≥ . . . ≥ λ(i)k > 0 be the eigenvalues
of Σi, i = 1, 2.
Theorem 1. If there exists N for which each profile M ∈ MN×k verifies
δΣ1(M) ≥ δΣ2(M) then
λ
(1)
i ≤ λ(2)i for i = 1, . . . , k (2)
Proof 4. We take a profile M ∈ Mk×k with Mi = 0 for i = 2, 3, . . . , N and
M1 = x ∈ Rk. By assumption
δΣ1(M) =
1
C2N
· dΣ1(x, 0) ≥ δΣ2(M) =
1
C2N
· dΣ2(x, 0).
Consequently, the hypothesis is reduced to dΣ1(x, 0) ≥ dΣ2(x, 0) for x ∈ Rk.
It means
5This is the case of our real example in Section 5 below.
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xΣ−11 x
t ≥ xΣ−12 xt ⇒ x
(
Σ−11 − Σ−12
)
xt ≥ 0 for x ∈ Rk.
Then (Σ−11 − Σ−12 ) is a non-negative definite matrix. Now we use the result
included in the AppendixB (see Point 11) to finish the proof:
Σ−11 ≥ Σ−12 =⇒
1
λ
(1)
i
≥ 1
λ
(2)
i
=⇒ λ(1)i ≤ λ(2)i for i = 1, 2, . . . , k.

The converse of Theorem 1 is not always true like Example 2 below shows.
Nevertheless, Theorem 2 below proves that a partial converse of Theorem 1
holds true under a technical restriction on the definite matrices.
Example 2. Let us consider a particular case of two matrices
Σ1 =
(
0.18 −0.16
−0.16 0.42
)
Σ2 =
(
0.60 0.20
0.20 0.30
)
whose eigenvalues verify λ
(1)
i ≤ λ(2)i for i = 1, 2 because λ(1)1 = 0.5, λ(1)2 = 0.1
and λ
(2)
1 = 0.7, λ
(2)
2 = 0.2.
Let M ∈ M2×2 be the profile M =
(
4 60
0 0
)
. The Mahalanobis dis-
sensus measures for M associated with Σ1 and Σ2 produce
δΣ1(M) = 14630.4 ≤ 14777.14 = δΣ2(M).
Therefore it is not true that δΣ1(M) ≥ δΣ2(M) holds throughout.
Theorem 2. If Σ1,Σ2 ∈Mk×k are commutable matrices and their eigenval-
ues verify λ
(1)
1 ≤ λ(2)k then
δΣ1(M) ≥ δΣ2(M)
for each size N and each profile M ∈MN×k.
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Proof 5. Assuming Σ1,Σ2 ∈ Mk×k are commutable, we can apply Point 12
in AppendixB to Σ−11 and Σ
−1
2 . Consequently, there exists an orthonormal
matrix Q ∈Mk×k such that
QtΣ−11 Q = D1 and Q
tΣ−12 Q = D2
being D1, D2 ∈ Mk×k diagonal matrices. It is possible to select Q in such a
way that the diagonal elements of D1 verify
1
λ
(1)
1
≤ . . . ,≤ 1
λ
(1)
k
. Thus
D1 = diag
(
1
λ
(1)
1
, . . . ,
1
λ
(1)
k
)
and D2 = diag
(
1
λ
(2)
pi(1)
, . . . ,
1
λ
(2)
pi(k)
)
,
where pi is a permutation of {1, 2, . . . , k}.6
Let x, y ∈ Rk be two row vectors. Since Q is an orthonormal matrix,
there exists a vector z ∈ Rk such that (x− y)t = Qz
dΣ1(x, y) = (x− y)Σ−11 (x− y)t = ztQtΣ−11 Qz = ztD1z =
k∑
j=1
1
λ
(1)
j
z2j
dΣ2(x, y) = (x− y)Σ−12 (x− y)t = ztQtΣ−12 Qz = ztD2z =
k∑
j=1
1
λ
(2)
pi(j)
z2j
From premise that λ
(1)
1 ≤ λ(2)k we have
1
λ
(1)
k
≥ . . . ≥ 1
λ
(1)
1
≥ 1
λ
(2)
k
≥ . . . ≥ 1
λ
(2)
1
.
Thus 1
λ
(1)
j
≥ 1
λ
(2)
pi(j)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , k and as a result it is obtained
k∑
j=1
1
λ
(1)
j
z2j ≥
k∑
j=1
1
λ
(2)
pi(j)
z2j .
6When Q does not lead to a diagonal matrix with properly ordered eigenvalues, we
change Q for Q′ = QP t, P being a permutation matrix. Q′ is also an orthogonal matrix
(see AppendixB, Point 10) which simultaneously diagonalizes Σ−11 and Σ
−1
2 . In addition,
we get a diagonal matrix D∗1 with the same eigenvalues that D1 but in the proper order.
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In consequence, dΣ1(x, y) ≥ dΣ2(x, y).
Now, using Definition 3 the theorem is proven. 
Example 3 below shows the relevance of hypothesis on the eigenvalues
(Theorem 2).
Example 3. Considering Σ1 and Σ2 from Example 2, we observe that they
are commutable matrices:
Σ1 Σ2 =
(
0.18 −0.16
−0.16 0.42
)(
0.6 0.2
0.2 0.3
)
=
(
0.076 −0.012
−0.012 0.094
)
Σ2 Σ1 =
(
0.6 0.2
0.2 0.3
)(
0.18 −0.16
−0.16 0.42
)
=
(
0.076 −0.012
−0.012 0.094
)
We can see that the assumption λ
(1)
1 ≤ λ(2)k even if k = 2 does not imply
λ
(1)
i ≤ λ(2)i for i = 1, 2 (see Equation 2, Theorem 1):
λ
(1)
1 = 0.5 < 0.7 = λ
(2)
1 ,
λ
(1)
2 = 0.1 < 0.2 = λ
(2)
2 ,
λ
(1)
1 = 0.5 > 0.2 = λ
(2)
2 .
Example 4 bellow reveals that the commutativity of Σ1 and Σ2 is not
superfluous in the statement of Theorem 2.
Example 4. Let us consider Σ1 =
(
0.05 0
0 0.1
)
and Σ2 =
(
0.6 0.2
0.2 0.3
)
,
with λ
(1)
2 = 0.05, λ
(1)
1 = 0.1 and λ
(2)
2 = 0.2, λ
(2)
1 = 0.7. These eigenvalues
satisfy λ
(1)
1 ≤ λ(2)2 and Σ1 and Σ2 matrices are not commutable:
Σ1 Σ2 =
(
0.03 0.01
0.02 0.03
)
6=
(
0.03 0.02
0.01 0.03
)
= Σ2 Σ1
Let M ∈ M2×2 be a specific profile, M =
(
4 60
0 0
)
. The Mahalanobis
dissensus measures for M associated with Σ1 and Σ2 produce
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δΣ1(M) = 360.8 ≤ 14, 777.14 = δΣ2(M). Therefore it is not true that
δΣ1(M) ≥ δΣ2(M) holds throughout.
Theorems 1 and 2 can be extended to r positive definite matrices Σ1, . . . ,Σr
as a matter of course.
Apart from Theorems 1 and 2, the following corollary reveals that the
Mahalanobis dissensus measure associated to Σ is confined within bounds
depending only on the extreme eigenvalues of Σ.
Corollary 1. Let Σ ∈ Mk×k be a positive definite matrix with eigenvalues
λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λk, it is verified
δλ1I(M) ≤ δΣ(M) ≤ δλkI(M)
or equivalently
1
λ1
· δI(M) ≤ δΣ(M) ≤ 1
λk
· δI(M)
for each N and for each M ∈MN×k.
Proof 6. This result is straightforward from Theorem 2. Observe that such
Theorem can be applied because λkI (resp., λ1I) and M are commutable
matrices and the eigenvalues of the diagonal matrix λkI (resp., λ1I) are all
equal to λk (resp. λ1). Proposition 2 is used. 
Figure 1 illustrates the previous corollary regarding the distances used
for δλ1I , δΣ and δλkI . We can observe that all points on the ellipse have the
same Mahalanobis distance to point A, namely dΣ. Moreover, distance dΣ is
always between the values of the corresponding distances dλ1I and dλkI .
5. Discussion on practical application using a real example
In this Section we fully develop a real example. It aims at giving an
explicit application of our proposal and discussing some of its features.
We are interested in assessing the cohesiveness of the forecasts of various
magnitudes for the Spanish Economy in 2014: GDP (Gross Domestic Pro-
duct), Unemployment Rate, Public Deficit, Public Debt and Inflation. These
forecasts have been published by different institutions and organizations, and
18
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Figure 1: Curves of equidistance to point A with dΣ (ellipse), dλ1I and dλkI (circumfe-
rences).
each one was made at around the same time. Specifically, three waves of
forecasts were published in the Spring of 2013 (Table 1), Autumn of 2013
(Table 2) and Spring of 2014 (Table 3).
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GDP U. Rate P. Deficit P. Debt Inflation
IMF 0.70 26.40 -6.90 97.60 1.50
OECD 0.40 28.00 -6.40 97.00 0.40
European Commission 0.90 26.40 -7.00 91.30 0.80
BBVA Research 0.90 26.40 -5.70 96.30 1.20
FUNCAS 0.50 26.00 -4.60 99.20 1.60
Abbreviations: Unemployment Rate (U. Rate), Public Deficit/Debt (P. Deficit/Debt), Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria Reseach (BBVA Research), Fundacio´n de las Cajas de Ahorros (FUNCAS).
Table 1: Forecasts for several magnitudes for the Spanish Economy for the year 2014
published in Spring of 2013.
GDP U. Rate P. Deficit P. Debt Inflation
IMF 0.20 26.70 -5.80 99.10 1.50
OECD 0.50 26.30 -6.10 98.00 0.50
European Commission 0.50 26.40 -5.90 99.90 0.90
BBVA Research 0.90 25.60 -5.80 98.50 1.10
FUNCAS 1.00 25.90 -5.90 100.50 1.30
Abbreviations: Unemployment Rate (U. Rate), Public Deficit/Debt (P. Deficit/Debt), Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria Reseach (BBVA Research), Fundacio´n de las Cajas de Ahorros (FUNCAS).
Table 2: Forecasts for sevaral magnitudes for the Spanish Economy for the year 2014
published in Autumn of 2013.
We intend to measure the cohesiveness of the aforementioned predictions.
Since they are expressed by cardinal valuations, we need to go beyond the
traditional analyses refered to in this paper. To this purpose, we first gather
the data corresponding to Tables 1, 2 and 3 in the profilesM (S),M (A),M (lS) ∈
M5×5, respectively. Next, we select a suitable reference matrix and finally we
make the computations of the Mahalanobis dissensus measures.
5.1. Reference matrix
Once the profiles have been fixed, the following step to compute their Ma-
halanobis dissensus measures is to avail oneself of a suitable reference matrix
Σ. The choice of such a matrix can easily raise controversy. Nevertheless, we
can learn from the role of the Σ matrix in the Mahalanobis distance from a
statistical point of view. This matrix contains the variances and covariances
20
GDP U. Rate P. Deficit P. Debt Inflation
IMF 0.90 25.50 -5.89 98.80 0.50
OECD 1.00 25.40 -5.50 98.30 0.10
European Commission 1.10 25.50 -5.60 103.80 0.10
BBVA Research 1.10 25.10 -5.80 98.40 1.10
FUNCAS 1.20 25.10 -6.00 100.00 0.10
Abbreviations: Unemployment Rate (U. Rate), Public Deficit/Debt (P. Deficit/Debt), Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria Reseach (BBVA Research), Fundacio´n de las Cajas de Ahorros (FUNCAS).
Table 3: Forecasts for several magnitudes for the Spanish Economy for the year 2014
published in Spring of 2014.
among the statistical variables, therefore, those characteristics are brought
into play in this distance. We recall that covariances (or corresponding cor-
relations) among variables reveal their interdependence. In Statistics, this Σ
matrix is usually unknown and it is estimated from a sample. One exception
is the unlikely case when the data are generated by a known multivariate
probability distribution. This is not the case of our example.
Year GDP U. Rate P. Deficit P. Debt Inflation
2001 3.70 10.55 0.50 55.60 2.70
2002 2.70 11.47 0.20 52.60 3.50
2003 3.10 11.48 0.30 48.80 3.00
2004 3.30 10.97 0.10 46.30 3.00
2005 3.60 9.16 -1.30 43.20 3.40
2006 4.10 8.51 -2.40 39.70 3.50
2007 3.50 8.26 -1.90 36.30 2.80
2008 0.90 11.33 4.50 40.20 4.10
2009 -3.70 18.01 11.20 53.90 -0.30
2010 -0.30 20.06 9.70 61.50 1.80
2011 0.40 21.64 9.40 69.30 3.20
2012 -1.40 25.03 10.60 84.20 2.40
Table 4: Past data for the Spanish Economy (2001 − 2012). Source: Spanish National
Statistics Institute (INE) and Bank of Spain.
Therefore we employ a reference matrix Σ that captures the variances and
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covariances among the macroeconomic magnitudes of the Spanish Economy.
It seems natural to produce such a matrix from historical macroeconomic
data corresponding to the issues under inspection. Table 4 contains such
recorded data, and Table 5 gives the corresponding correlation coefficients. 7
These values are depicted in Figure 2. Each ellipse represents the correlation
between a pair of variables. The ellipses slant upward (resp., downward)
show a positive (resp., negative) correlation. Moreover, the narrower the
ellipse the stronger correlation represented. For example, the pair formed by
GDP and Public Deficit holds the strongest negative correlation.
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Figure 2: A depiction of the correlation matrix of the Spanish macroeconomic data from
2001 to 2012.
7Given two vectors X = (x1, . . . , xn)
′ and Y = (y1, . . . , yn)′ with x and y
their respective means, the correlation coefficient between X and Y is computed by
cor(X,Y ) =
∑n
i=1(xi − x)(yi − y)√∑n
i=1(xi − x)2
√∑n
i=1(yi − y)2
.
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GDP U. Rate P. Deficit P. Debt Inflation
GDP 1.00 -0.81 -0.94 -0.59 0.73
U. Rate -0.81 1.00 0.93 0.92 -0.46
P. Deficit -0.94 0.93 1.00 0.75 -0.60
P. Debt -0.59 0.92 0.75 1.00 -0.30
Inflation 0.73 -0.46 -0.60 -0.30 1.00
Table 5: Correlations between macroeconomic magnitudes for historial data.
On the basis of Table 4, we compute the corresponding variance-covariance
matrix Σ 8.
Σ =

6.11 −11.49 −12.43 −20.19 2.03
−11.49 32.74 28.43 72.42 −2.97
−12.43 28.43 28.41 55.41 −3.60
−20.19 72.42 55.41 190.52 −4.73
2.03 −2.97 −3.60 −4.73 1.28

5.2. Computation of the dissensus
Now we calculate the Mahalanobis dissensus measures associated with Σ
for the profiles of the forecasts for the Spanish Economy, namely, M (S), M (A)
and M (lS).
We obtain the following Mahalanobis dissensus measures associated with
the aforementioned Σ:
δΣ(M
(S)) = 8.45, δΣ(M
(A)) = 2.05, δΣ(M
(lS)) = 1.51.
Note that the measure of the dissensus decreases along the time. This is
what we intuitively expect, since the latter forecasts rest on more accurate
and factual information.
Apart from the measure of the cohesiveness of the profiles, our proposal
also produces a measure of divergence among the evaluations of different
agents on a set of issues. We can answer questions like “Are the predictions of
8Let X be a n× k matrix whose columns have means Xi, i = 1, . . . , k. The cells of the
variance-covariance matrix are Σij =
1
n− 1
n∑
r=1
(xri −Xi)(xrj −Xj).
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the European Commission for the Spanish Economy similar to the predictions
of the BBVA Reseach?” or “Is the previous comparison more or less similar
than the comparison between the predictions of the BBVA Research vs. the
predictions of the IMF?”. Table 6 provides these items for comparison.
Spring 2013 Autumn 2013 Spring 2014
OECD FUNCAS 23.18 2.85 0.27
European Comm. FUNCAS 19.65 1.21 0.61
IMF FUNCAS 9.31 3.63 1.15
OECD BBVA Research 8.05 2.50 2.04
European Comm. BBVA Research 5.62 1.25 2.86
IMF OECD 5.24 2.76 0.93
IMF European Comm. 4.87 1.47 2.62
BBVA Research FUNCAS 4.52 0.12 2.10
IMF BBVA Research 3.31 4.11 0.86
OECD European Comm. 0.79 0.60 1.61
Table 6: Dissensus between pairs of agents for the profiles of forecasts published in Spring
of 2013 (in descending order), Autumn of 2013 and Spring of 2014.
5.3. Other simpler approaches: Drawbacks or limitations
The choice of the reference matrix is a key point in the application of
the Mahalanobis dissensus measure. As an explanatory exercise in this sub-
section we discuss on the more simplistic approaches where naive reference
matrices are employed. If we use the identity matrix as the reference matrix
(for example, because we lack data to make a better inference), then we get
a Mahalanobis dissensus measure which gives the same importance to the
differences in all the issues (see Subsection 3.1). However the choice of the
identity matrix as the reference matrix discards much relevant information.
We note the variance of the Public Debt is 190.52, while Inflation has a vari-
ance of 1.28 (see Σ). So, a difference of one unit in the forecasts from two
agents does not signify the same if such a difference corresponds to Inflation
or to Public Debt.
We could alternatively employ as the reference matrix, the diagonal ma-
trix with the variances of the issues, that is,
Σσ = diag(6.11, 32.74, 28.41, 190.52, 1.28).
In this case, we remove the effects of the interdependence among the economic
magnitudes on the dissensus measure.
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In order to check that an inconvenient choice of the reference matrix eas-
ily produces misleading conclusions. Table 7 shows the dissensus measures
derived from the three matrices mentioned above, Σ, I and Σσ. The dis-
sensus δΣ is decreasing along time as previously reported. This intuitively
appealing feature is not captured when we utilize simpler matrices. Conse-
quently, introducing corrections due to variances or to cross-effects is crucial
for a reliable final analysis.
Profiles
M (S) M (A) M (lS)
Reference matrix Spring 2013 Autumn 2013 Spring 2014
Σ δΣ 8.45 2.05 1.51
Diagonal δΣσ 0.61 0.29 0.37
Identity δI 21.59 2.97 11.20
Table 7: Dissensus for several profiles of economic forecasts for the Spanish Economy for
the year 2014. Data published in Spring of 2013, Autumn of 2013 and in Spring of 2014.
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6. Concluding remarks
We explore the problem of measuring the degree of cohesiveness in a se-
tting where experts express their opinions on alternatives or issues by means
of cardinal evaluations. We use the general concept of dissensus measure and
introduce one particular formulation based on the Mahalanobis distance for
numerical vectors, namely the Mahalanobis dissensus measure.
We provide some properties which make our proposal appealing. We
emphasize that the Mahalanobis dissensus measure on the profiles with k
issues or alternatives is scale-independent for each issue and it accounts for
cross-relations of issues. In addition, the comparison between different Ma-
halanobis dissensus measures can be made through the eigenvalues of their
associated matrices.
We illustrate our proposal with a real numerical application about fore-
casts for several magnitudes for the Spanish Economy. We discuss the rele-
vance of the choice of the reference matrix in this context.
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AppendixA. Proofs of properties in Section 3.2
Proof of property 1. Neutrality.
Let us first prove sufficiency. If Σ = diag{λ, . . . , λ} for a value λ > 0, the
thesis is straightforward from the Definition 3.
Let us now prove necessity. Due to the fact that δΣ verifies neutrality for
any profile M ∈MN×k and for any permutation pi of {1, . . . , k}
δΣ(M) = δΣ(
piM),
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it must be deduced Σ = diag{λ, . . . , λ} for a value λ > 0.
Let M ∈ M2×k be a particular profile such that M =
(
M1
M2
)
. The dis-
sensus measure for M ∈M2×k is given by δΣ(M) = (M1−M2)Σ−1(M1−M2)t
according to Definition 3. If M is permuted by means of pi, we obtain the
matrix piM ∈ M2×k and consequently its dissensus measure is δΣ(piM) =
(piM1 −pi M2)Σ−1(piM1 −pi M2)t.
According to Point 10 in AppendixB, we can write piM = MPpi, being
Ppi ∈Mk×k the corresponding permutation matrix. Consequently,
δΣ(
piM) = (M1Ppi −M2Ppi)Σ−1(M1Ppi −M2Ppi)t =
= (M1 −M2)PpiΣ−1P tpi(M1 −M2)t.
Since δΣ verifies neutrality, δΣ(M) = δΣ(
piM) for any M ∈M2×k,
Σ−1 = PpiΣ−1P tpi.
Using the spectral decomposition (see AppendixB, Points 15 and 16) Σ−1
can be written as Σ−1 = ΓD−1λ Γ
t for a unique orthogonal matrix Γ. Therefore
Σ−1 = PpiΣ−1P tpi = PpiΓD
−1
λ Γ
tP tpi.
Observe that the matrix PpiΓ is orthogonal because it is the product of
two orthogonal matrices. Since the spectral decomposition assures that Γ is
unique, it must be
Γ = PpiΓ
for every Ppi ∈ Mk×k permutation matrix. Note that this equation implies
that performing any permutation of the rows of Γ produces Γ.
Therefore Γ must be the identity matrix, i.e., Γ = I.
We can now deduce
Σ−1 = ΓD−1λ Γ
t = D−1λ ,
Σ−1 = PpiΓD−1λ Γ
tP tpi = PpiD
−1
λ P
t
pi.
Thus we conclude that Σ is a diagonal matrix.
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Let us now prove that the diagonal elements of Σ = Dλ are all equal.
From the above equalities of Σ−1, it is verified D−1λ = PpiD
−1
λ P
t
pi, for any
permutation pi of {1, . . . , k}.
For the particular permutation matrix
Ppi =

0 1 · · · 0
1 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1
 ,
we obtain PpiD
−1
λ P
t
pi = diag{λ−12 , λ−11 , . . . λ−1k } and given thatD−1λ = PpiD−1λ P tpi,
it must be λ1 = λ2. A routine modification of the argument proves λ1 = λj,
j = 3, . . . , k.

Proof of property 2. Oneness.
Let N be a fixed value. We take a profile M ∈ MN×k with Mi = 0 for
i = 2, . . . , N and M1 = x ∈ Rk any row vector. For this particular profile the
hypothesis δΣ1(M) = δΣ2(M) reduces to dΣ1(x, 0) = dΣ2(x, 0). It means that,
x
(
Σ−11 − Σ−12
)
xt = 0 and
(
Σ−11 − Σ−12
)
is a non-negative definite matrix.
Let cij be the elements of the matrix
(
Σ−11 − Σ−12
)
. Considering the i-th
row vector of the canonical base ei = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) then,
ei
(
Σ−11 − Σ−12
)
eti = cii = 0. Therefore c11 = . . . = ckk = 0 and
trace
(
Σ−11 − Σ−12
)
= 0. As a consequence, using AppendixB (Point 13),
Σ1 = Σ2.

Proof of property 3. Cardinal transformations.
Let a = (a1, . . . , ak)
t be a column vector and B = diag(b1, . . . , bk) be a
diagonal matrix. The affine transformation of the profile M ∈MN×k is M∗ =
1N a
t + M B, M∗ ∈ MN×k. Its columns are defined by
M∗ j = aj · 1N + bj · M j and its rows are defined by
M∗i = (a1 + b1Mi1, . . . , ak + bkMik) = a+MiB .
Let Σ∗ = BΣBt be the Σ matrix updated according to the affine trans-
formation. Then, all elements σ∗ij of Σ
∗ and all elements σij of Σ are related
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by σ∗ij = bibjσij. Due to the fact that B is a diagonal matrix, B = B
t
and (Σ∗)−1 = B−1Σ−1B−1. We now proceed to compute the Mahalanobis
distance under the previous remarks:
dΣ∗(M
∗
i ,M
∗
j ) = (M
∗
i −M∗j )(Σ∗)−1(M∗i −M∗j )t =
= (a+MiB − a−MjB)(BΣBt)−1 (a+MiB − a−MjB)t =
= (Mi −Mj)BB−1Σ−1B−1B (Mi −Mj)t =
= (Mi −Mj)Σ−1(Mi −Mj)t =
= dΣ(Mi,Mj).
Based on the previous distance, we obtain:
δΣ∗(M
∗) =
1
C2N
·
∑
i<j
dΣ∗(M
∗
i ,M
∗
j ) =
1
C2N
·
∑
i<j
dΣ(Mi,Mj) = δΣ(M)

Proof of property 4. Replication monotonicity.
Let us compute the Mahalanobis dissensus measure for
M unionmultiM .
δΣ(M unionmultiM) = 1C22N ·
2N∑
i=1
2N∑
j=1
i<j
dΣ((M unionmultiM)i, (M unionmultiM)j) =
= 1
C22N
·
 N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
i<j
dΣ(Mi,Mj) +
N∑
i=1
2N∑
j=N+1
dΣ(Mi,Mj)
+
+ 1
C22N
·
 2N∑
i=N
2N∑
j=1
i<j
dΣ(Mi,Mj)
 = 1C22N · C2N · δΣ(M)+
+ 1
C22N
·
N∑
i=1
N∑
r=1
dΣ(Mi,MN+r) +
1
C22N
·
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
i<j
dΣ(Mi,Mj) =
= 1
C22N
· ( 4C2N · δΣ(M) ) =
(
2N−2
2N−1
) · δΣ(M)
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Therefore
δΣ(M unionmultiM) =
(
2N − 2
2N − 1
)
· δΣ(M)
and in particular
δΣ(M unionmultiM ) > δΣ(M).

Proof of property 5. Splitting the set of alternatives.
We set X = I1∪I2 = {x1, ..., xr}∪{xr+1, ..., xk} as a partition of the alter-
natives. Given Σ =
(
Σ11 0
0 Σ22
)
, where Σ11 ∈ Mr×r , Σ22 ∈ M(k−r)×(k−r) ,
for each profile M = (M I1 ,M I2) where M I1 ∈ MN×r , M I2 ∈ MN×(k−r) .
Recalling Point 5 in AppendixB
Σ−1 =
(
Σ−111 0
0 Σ−122
)
.
We are now in a position to calculate dΣ(Mi,Mj), the Mahalanobis dis-
tance between a pair of agents i and j:
dΣ(Mi,Mj) = (M
I1
i −M I1j )Σ−111 (M I1i −M I1j )t+
+ (M I2i −M I2j )Σ−122 (M I2i −M I2j )t =
= dΣ11(M
I1
i ,M
I1
j ) + dΣ22(M
I2
i ,M
I2
j ).
Using Definition 3, the Mahalanobis dissensus measure on M associated
with Σ is given by
δΣ(M) =
1
C2N
·
∑
i<j
dΣ(Mi,Mj) =
= 1
C2N
·
∑
i<j
(
dΣ11(M
I1
i ,M
I1
j ) + dΣ22(M
I2
i ,M
I2
j )
)
=
= δΣ11(M
I1) + δΣ22(M
I2).
(A.1)
It is easy to check that this property holds true for any size of the parti-
tion. We setX = I1∪I2∪. . .∪Is as a partition of the alternatives. Considering
not cross-effects among the subsets of the alternatives, the Σ ∈Mk×k matrix
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has a block diagonal form, Σ = diag(Σ11, . . . ,Σss). Analogously, a profile
M ∈MN×k can be written as M = (M I1 ,M I2 , . . . ,M Is). Then
δΣ(M) =
s∑
i=1
δΣii(M
Ii).

Proof of property 6. Adding alternatives.
The proof is straightforward from Equation (A.1). 
Proof of property 7. Adding agents to the society.
Let M ∈ MN×k be a profile on X of the society N, M¯ ∈ M(N+1)×k a
expansion of M by adding the evaluations of a new agent, M¯N+1. Then
δΣ(M¯) =
1
C2N+1
·
∑
i<j
dΣ(M¯i, M¯j) =
1
C2N+1
·
N+1∑
i=1
N+1∑
j=1
i<j
dΣ(M¯i, M¯j) =
= 1
C2N+1
·
 N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
i<j
dΣ(Mi,Mj) +
N∑
i=1
dΣ(Mi, M¯N+1)
 =
= 1
C2N+1
·
(
C2N · δΣ(M) +
N∑
i=1
dΣ(Mi, M¯N+1)
)
=
= N−1
N+1
· δΣ(M) + 1C2N+1 ·
N∑
i=1
dΣ(Mi, M¯N+1).
Now we have to minimize δΣ(M¯). Obviously, the vector which minimizes
δΣ(M¯) is the vector that gathers the opinion of the agent N +1 in the profile
M¯ . For simplicity we recall M¯N+1 like x ∈ Rk. From δΣ(M¯) expression, it is
enough to resolve
min
x
N∑
i=1
dΣ(Mi, x) = min
x
N∑
i=1
(
MiΣ
−1M ti − 2MiΣ−1xt + xΣ−1xt
)
,
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or equivalently,
min
x
N∑
i=1
(−2MiΣ−1xt + xΣ−1xt).
We solve it by the standard method using Point 14 in the AppendixB.
∂
∂x
N∑
i=1
(−2MiΣ−1xt + xΣ−1xt) = −2 N∑
i=1
(
MiΣ
−1)t + N∑
i=1
2Σ−1xt =
= −2
(∑N
i=1 Σ
−1M ti
)
+ 2NΣ−1xt =
= −2Σ−1
(∑N
i=1 M
t
i −Nxt
)
= 0.
N∑
i=1
M ti −Nxt = 0 =⇒ x =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Mi.
Due to the fact that the second derivative is 2NΣ−1, a positive definite
matrix, we have a minimum in x = 1
N
N∑
i=1
Mi.

AppendixB. Review in matrix algebra
This appendix contains some technical results and background material
of matrix analysis which are particularly useful in this paper. Let A be a
real matrix of order n× n.
1. A diagonal matrix A with diagonal elements a11, a22, . . . , ann is repre-
sented as A = diag(a11, a22, . . . , ann).
2. The trace of a matrix A of dimension n× n is the sum of its diagonal
elements, i.e., trace(A) =
n∑
i=1
= aii.
3. Two matrices A and B of dimensions n × n are commutable if AB =
BA. It is also said that they commute. We say that a family of
n × n matrices A1, A2, . . . , Ak is a commutable family if for any i, j ∈
{1, . . . , k}, Ai and Aj commute.
4. A matrix A is orthogonal if ATA = AAT = I, i.e. A−1 = AT .
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5. The inverse matrix of a partitioned matrix A =
(
A11 A12
A21 A22
)
, where
A11 and A22 are non singular, is(
(A11 − A21A−122 A12)−1 −A11A12 (A22 − A21A−111 A12)−1
−(A22 − A21A−111 A12)−1A21A−111 (A22 − A21A−111 A12)−1
)
.
6. Let v be a vector n × 1. A symmetric matrix A is a positive semi-
definite matrix (or non-negative definite matrix) if vtAv ≥ 0 and A is
a positive definite matrix if vtAv > 0 for all non-zero vector v.
7. If there exist a scalar λ and a non-zero vector γ such that Aγ = λγ, we
call them an eigenvalue of A and an associated eigenvector, respectively.
8. There are up to n eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λn of A. If A is a positive semi-
definite matrix, its eigenvalues are all non-negative.
9. If A is a positive definite matrix, its eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λn are positive
values and A−1 has eigenvalues λ−11 , . . . , λ
−1
n .
10. A permutation matrix of order n× n is a square matrix obtained from
the same size identity matrix by a permutation of rows. Let pi be a
permutation of {1, 2, ..., k} and let ei be the i -th vector of the canonical
base of Rn, that is, eij = 1 if i = j, eij = 0 otherwise. We define
the permutation matrix Ppi whose rows are epi(i). We rearrange the
corresponding rows (resp. columns) of A using the permutation pi by
left (resp., right) multiplication, PpiA (resp., APpi). Every row and every
column of a permutation matrix contain exactly one nonzero entry,
which is 1. A product of permutation matrices is again a permutation
matrix. The inverse of a permutation matrix is again a permutation
matrix. In fact, P−1 = P t.
11. LetA andB be p×p symmetric matrices. IfA−B is a non-negative defi-
nite matrix, then it is expressed as A ≥ B. In this case
chi(A) ≥ chi(B) for i = 1, . . . , p, where chi(A) denotes the i -th charac-
teristic root of a symmetric matrix A, arranged in increasing order
(Fujikoshi et al., 2010, pp. 497 (A.1.9)).
12. A theorem on a simultaneous diagonizable family of matrices. A set
consisting of symmetric n × n matrices, A1, . . . , Ar, is simultaneously
diagonalizable by an orthogonal matrix if and only if they commute
in pairs, that is to say, for each i 6= j, AiAj = AjAi. Simultaneously
diagonalizable means that there exists an orthogonal matrix U such
that U tAiU = Di where Di is a diagonal matrix for every Ai in the set
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(Horn and Johnson, 2010, pp. 52, theorem 1.3.19) and (Harville, 1997,
pp. 561).
13. If a non negative definite matrix has trace equal to zero, then this
matrix is zero (Harville, 1997, pp. 238).
14. If A is a symmetric matrix n× n, x and b are vectors of length n, then
∂ Ax
∂x
=
∂ xtA
∂x
= A ;
∂ btx
∂x
=
∂ xbt
∂x
= b ;
∂ xtAx
∂x
= 2 · Aa.
See Harville (1997).
15. Spectral decomposition. Let Σ be a k×k real symmetric matrix. There
exists an orthogonal matrix Γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γk), whose column vectors
γi are the normalized eigenvectors of Σ, γ
t
iγi = 1. Its eigenvalues are
λ1, . . . , λk. It is verified that Γ
tΣΓ = Dλ where Dλ = diag(λ1, . . . , λk)
is a diagonal matrix with λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λk. In this way Γ is unique.
9 We note that Σ = ΓDλΓ
t, that is, Σ =
∑k
i=1 λiγiγ
t
i .
16. When Σ is a positive semi-definite matrix, all its characteristic roots
or eigenvalues are real and greater than or equal to zero. Accordingly,
the inverse of Σ is Σ−1 = ΓD−1λ Γ
t.
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